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Court. (R.221-239). With clear evidence before the court that 
Appellant had not been ignoring the proceeding, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to dismiss this action, and a 
fortiori to do so with prejudice. 
Hartford Leasing pursued it's causes of action by fighting 
battles on several fronts. Hartford worked to hold on to the 
building, investigate and gather evidence, attempt to negotiate a 
resolution of the dispute, and to keep attorneys employed and 
working on the case. The simple statement in Appellee's brief that 
all Hartford did was to try to retain an attorney is a gross over 
simplification and ignores the reality that litigation is much more 
than what appears of record on the court's docket. 
From December of 1990 to the present Hartford fought to retain 
ownership of the building (which was then vacant as a result of 
rumors of a gas plume which had alledgedly permeated the ground 
beneath it) . The damage from this gas spill was chargeable to the 
negligence of one or all of the Appellees, or in the alternative, 
to the State of Utah if it improperly vacated the building contrary 
to it's lease obligations. Since no revenue was flowing to pay the 
underlying indebtedness the debtor was forced to mitigate its 
damages through negotiations. Attorney Steven Call negotiated 
additional time and terms of repayment on the million dollar debt. 
(R. 236-237) . Mr. Call also negotiated with the State concerning 
settlement of the claims arising out of the it's vacation of the 
building as late as July 31, 1992. (R. 238). 
Following the close of its bankruptcy, Hartford Leasing 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following rules and statutes are determinative with 
respect to some of the issues raised by Hartford Leasing and are 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellant concurs in the briefs of the Appellees' that the 
correct standard of review for Appellant's sixth issue is the 
correction of error standard. However, whether this Court applies 
a correction of error standard or reviews the Trial Court's 
conclusions as a matter of law, no deference should be paid to the 
interpretation of the statute by the Trial Court. Savage 
Industries v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 666-65 (Utah 
1991) . 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE 
WHERE HARTFORD LEASING PURSUED THIS ACTION CONTINUOUSLY 
FROM THE DATE OF FILING THE INITIAL COMPLAINT. 
Appellant Hartford Leasing continuously and diligently pursued 
this action from the date the initial Complaint was filed to the 
date the Trial Court dismissed this action with prejudice. The 
actions taken by Hartford Leasing can be segregated into four 
categories which include: (a) efforts made to retain several 
attorneys; (b) efforts to salvage the building and mitigate 
damages; (c) informal discovery; and (d) efforts to negotiate a 
settlement. These efforts were all clearly defined in the record 
before the lower court and are a part of the record before this 
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Court. (R.221-239). With clear evidence before the court that 
Appellant had not been ignoring the proceeding, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to dismiss this action, and a 
fortiori to do so with prejudice. 
The efforts of Appellant to retain and Appellant Hartford 
Leasing diligently pursued this action by seeking out and obtaining 
governmental records concerning investigations into the presence of 
a gasoline plume on Hartford Leasing's property. (R. 221-239). 
Contrary to Appellee Rio Vista's argument and characterization (Rio 
Vista Brief, p. 7), Appellant Hartford Leasing did more from 
December 1990 to the present than merely attempt to obtain legal 
counsel. 
From December of 1990 to the present, Hartford vigorously 
attempted to retain ownership of the building, which was 
practically rendered worthless as a result of the damages alleged 
by the Plaintiff to be chargeable to the Appellees' conduct. 
Through negotiations with the mortgage holder and Hartford 
Leasing's newly retained attorney Steven Call of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker negotiated additional time and terms of repayment on a 
million dollar debt with no cash flowing from the leasehold tenancy 
of the State of Utah. (R. 236-237) . Attorney Call was in 
communication with Attorney Clegg for Appellee State concerning the 
State's vacation of the building as late as July 31, 1992. (R. 
238) . Appellant also filed and pursued reorganization of its 
financial situation in United States Bankruptcy Court. 
Following the close of its bankruptcy, Hartford Leasing 
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actively sought out new counsel to represent its interests in this 
action. Appellant retained . counsel (Watkiss & Saperstein), who 
began investigating the matter seriously and billed Hartford 
Leasing $8,420.00, but was forced to withdraw when a conflict of 
interest was discovered which prevented their being able to 
continue their representation of Hartford Leasing in this case. 
(R. 236-237) . Hartford Leasing thereupon retained Steven Call of 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. (R. 235-238) . Finally, in December of 
1992 Hartford Leasing consulted with their present counsel and 
entered into a contract with him to represent their interest on a 
contingency fee basis. (R. 238). 
All of the above efforts through counsel were going on 
simultaneously while Appellant continued to gather evidence 
informally, and to participate as an active non-party observer of 
the litigation that was progressing among the Defendants themselves 
over substantially the same issues. Hartford was in the enviable 
position of being able to claim that one of the three defendants 
was the cause of its damages while the defendants themselves were 
involved in separate but related litigation to decide who among 
them was responsible for the gas plume, and therefore the cleanup 
costs associated therewith. The evidence and proof submitted in 
that litigation was all directly applicable to its case. It was 
prudent for Hartford to make use of the development of those cases. 
Contrary to the position urged by the Appellees, Appellant Hartford 
Leasing diligently prepared its case. The Trial Court, by ignoring 
the fact that these efforts were proceeding outside it's docket 
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record, abused its discretion in dismissing this case with 
prejudice. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THIS 
ACTION BECAUSE NEW COUNSEL HAD BEEN RETAINED WHO 
REACTIVATED THIS CASE. 
The Trial * Court abused its discretion by dismissing this 
action because Appellant had obtained new counsel who had 
reactivated this case. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
trial court and remand this case for further proceedings. 
The law in this state is clear that it is an abuse of 
discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute where a party 
has retained new counsel who has reactivated the case. This is 
clearly the holding in Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, 
1370 (Utah 1977) . In Johnson, the court found it to be an abuse of 
discretion to dismiss the action where "new counsel caused the case 
to be activated." Johnson at 1370. 
Immediately preceding the dismissal of this case, new counsel 
for Hartford Leasing had reactivated the case. In Johnson, the 
only action taken by new counsel prior to filing the motions was to 
file a notice of appearance. In the present case, new counsel for 
Hartford Leasing, in fulfilling his due diligence obligations as an 
attorney, went to the Court in Moab and inspected the building just 
days prior to both the filing of his Notice of Appearance and 
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss. New counsel for Hartford Leasing 
was clearly in the process of reactivating this case prior to the 
Appellees' filing of their Motions to dismiss. Because new counsel 
was reactivating this case, the trial court abused its discretion 
7 
in dismissing this action. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THIS 
ACTION WITHOUT GIVING ANY PRIOR WARNING OR DIRECTION TO 
HARTFORD LEASING TO PROSECUTE THIS ACTION OR FACE 
DISMISSAL. 
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this 
action without giving any prior warning or direction to Hartford 
Leasing to either prosecute this action or face the possibility of 
dismissal. In Country Meadows v. Utah Department of Health, 851 
P.2d 1212 (Ut. App. 1993), this Court, in discussing the exercise 
of a Trial Court's discretion in dismissing an action, stated 
Therefore, within the above parameters, a trial court retains 
discretion to dismiss an action xif a party fails to move 
forward according to the rules and the directions of the 
court, without justifiable excuse.7 
Country Meadows at 1215 quoting Westing-house Electric Supply Co. v. 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1975) [emphasis added] . Thus, under Country Meadows, a Court has 
the right to exercise its discretion in dismissing an action if the 
party has both ignored the rules and the directions of the Court. 
This holding, setting forth the standard in the conjunctive, 
implies that the Court has an affirmative duty to direct a litigant 
that unless action is taken, the case will be dismissed. The use 
of the conjunctive term "and" in this holding leaves no doubt of 
the intent of the appellate court in making this ruling. Such a 
reading comports with Utah law stating that dismissal is a severe 
sanction. Country Meadows at 1215. This is especially true where 
it is clear that lesser sanctions are available to the court, such 
as imposing costs and fees upon the party against whom such a 
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motion has been filed. 
In the present case, the Trial Court did not issue any 
warnings or other directions to Hartford Leasing to pursue its 
action. Applying the standard set forth in Country Meadows. we are 
left to conclude that the Trial Court abused its discretion by 
failing to warn or otherwise direct Hartford Leasing to pursue its 
action or face dismissal. 
IV. HARTFORD LEASING DID NOT WAIVE ITS REQUEST FOR A HEARING 
ON THE APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RENDERING OF A DECISION ON THESE MOTIONS WITHOUT HOLDING 
A HEARING OR RULING ON THE REQUEST FOR A HEARING VIOLATED 
HARTFORD LEASING'S RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by rendering a decision 
of the Appellees' motions to dismiss without holding a hearing as 
requested by Appellant Hartford Leasing pursuant to Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Hartford Leasing did not 
waive its right to such a hearing when it filed its Notice to 
Submit for Decision pursuant to that same rule. Finally, not only 
did the trial court abuse its discretion by rendering a decision on 
these motions without holding a hearing, such action constitutes a 
violation of Hartford Leasing's constitutional right to due process 
of law. 
The trial court abused its discretion by rendering its 
decision on the Appellees' motions to dismiss without holding a 
hearing as requested by Hartford Leasing pursuant to Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Under this rule, when a 
party requests a hearing, the trial court must grant such hearing 
unless it finds that 
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(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) 
that the dispositive issues governing the granting or denial 
of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
Rule 4-501(3) (c) , Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1993). 
Thus, under the rule, the trial court must make findings that one 
of the two afore stated exceptions applies. In the present case, 
the trial court did not make such findings. Therefore, the trial 
court abused its discretion by failing to follow Rule 4-501(3) (c) 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
The trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Appellant 
Hartford Leasing's Notice to Submit for Decision constituted a 
waiver of its requests and right to a hearing under Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Subsection (3) (f) of 
this rule states, "If no written request for a hearing is made at 
the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on 
the motion shall be deemed waived." Rule 4-501(3) (f) , Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration (1993). The rule expressly contains a 
waiver provision which is applicable only where the parties fail to 
make such a request in their principal memoranda. In the present 
case, Appellant made a request for a hearing on the Appellees' 
motions to dismiss in it principal memoranda. (R. 112) . Moreover 
Appellant Hartford Leasing did not expressly waive its right to the 
hearing. 
Appellant Hartford Leasing argues that it did not waive its 
right to a hearing by filing its Notice to Submit for decision. 
Hartford Leasing's filing of a Notice to Submit for Decision was 
not a "waiver" as defined by Utah case law, because Hartford 
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Leasing did not intend to relinquish its right to the requested 
hearing. "Waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right." United Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co. , 220 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1993) . Hartford Leasing was aware that 
it had a right to a hearing which is why it requested such a 
hearing. However, Hartford Leasing was not aware nor did it intend 
that by requesting that the matter be submitted to the court that 
this act would be construed as a waiver. Since the court had to 
rule to grant a hearing the notice to submit was simply requesting 
the court to do so. 
The trial court abused its discretion by stating that Hartford 
Leasing7s Notice to Submit for Decision constituted a waiver of its 
earlier request for a hearing. Rule 4-501(1) (d) states 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of 
the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party 
may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate 
written pleading and captioned, "Notice to Submit for 
Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of 
mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the 
motion will not be submitted for decision. 
Rule 4-501(1) (d) , Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1993) . The 
clear purpose of this rule is to inform the court that all of the 
memoranda concerning the issue have been or should have been filed 
and that the matter is ready for the court's further consideration. 
It does not alleviate the requirement that the Court hold a hearing 
if one has been so requested pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(f) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Thus, because Hartford 
Leasing did nothing more than inform the Court, pursuant to its own 
rule, that all of the memoranda had been or should have been 
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submitted, and because Hartford Leasing had requested a hearing in 
its principal memorandum, the trial court abused its discretion by 
ruling that Hartford Leasing had waived its right to the requested 
hearing. 
The trial court's failure to hold the request hearing violated 
Hartford Leasing's right to due process under the law. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 758 (Utah 
1990), in discussing Rule 4-501's requirement that memorandum be 
served on the opposing party at least ten days prior to the holding 
of any hearing on the matter, stated, 
Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness 
. . . Many cases have held that where notice is ambiguous or 
inadequate to inform a party of the nature of a proceeding 
against him or not given sufficiently in advance of the 
proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due 
process. 
Cornish Town at 756 citing to Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 
1211-1212 (Utah 1983)[emphasis added; other citations on violation 
of due process footnoted at footnote No. 5 in Cornish Town at 756 
omitted] . It is axiomatic that denying a party the opportunity to 
be heard, especially when that party has requested that opportunity 
pursuant to the Court's own rules, is a violation of due process 
which is more egregious than merely given that party inadequate 
time to properly prepare. Thus, because the trial court abused its 
discretion by rendering a decision of the Appellees' motions to 
dismiss without holding a hearing thereby violating Hartford 
Leasing7s right to due process, this Court should remand this 
action to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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V. THE RECORD FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL CONSTITUTES ALL OF 
THE RECORD TRANSMITTED TO THIS COURT BY THE LOWER COURT. 
The record*for purposes of this appeal is the entire record as 
prepared by the lower court and transmitted to this Court for 
purposes of this appeal. The Appellees' arguments that this Court 
should disregard those portions of the record flies in the face of 
both the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Case law. 
Thus, this Court should consider the entire record as prepared by 
the lower court for purposes of this appeal. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly define what the 
record is for purposes of an appeal. Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure defines the composition of the record on appeal 
as 
The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the 
transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the 
clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket 
sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1993) . It is clear in 
the present case that the record as prepared by the lower court and 
transmitted to this Court includes both the Supplemental Memorandum 
in Opposition of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 151-162) and 
Hartford Leasing's Objections to Proposed Order (R. 197-199) plus 
the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Hartford 
Leasing's Objections to Proposed order (R. 217-312). Thus, these 
documents are a part of the record for purposes of appeal pursuant 
to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This Court should consider the entire record as prepared and 
transmitted by the lower court because Hartford Leasing preserved 
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its objections below First, the trial court made a minute entry 
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Rule 4-504 and pursuant to order of the lower court coi insel for 
Appellee State was ordered to prepare a proposed order based on the 
trial, court's minute entry granting Appellee's motions to dismiss. 
Pur si lant to Ri L! e 4 -5 04 of the Utah Code of J i id :i c :i a ] A dn i :i :n :i strati on, 
"Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel 
within five days after service." Rule 4 -504(2), Utah Code of 
Jud i ci a] Mini i :i :i strat i :>i I (1 9 93) It :i s • cl e ar from tl I = i ecord that 
Appellant Hartford Leasing submitted its objections to the proposed 
order as prescribed by Rule 4-504(2). It is clear from the rule 
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that one of the purposes for its enactment was to have the court 
review such objections prior to entering the final order. However, 
in the present case, it is clear from the record that the lower 
court refused to even consider the proposed objections. Such a 
failure to consider Hartford Leasing7s objections to the proposed 
order renders this rule meaningless and is a clear abuse of 
discretion. Because the trial court abused its discretion, this 
Court should remand this case to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
VI. RULE 4-506 OPERATES AS A STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS IN AN 
ACTION UNTIL THE REQUIRED NOTICE IS GIVEN AND THE TIME 
THEREAFTER HAS ELAPSED. PERMITTING ANY PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
ABSENCE OF SUCH NOTICE IS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court abused its discretion by permitting the 
Appellees' to file the motions to dismiss in violation of Rule 4-
506. A fortiori, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to 
rule on these motions. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial 
court and remand this case for further proceedings. 
The provisions of Rule 4-506 operate as a stay in the 
proceedings until the requisite notice has been given and the time 
thereafter has elapsed. Rule 4-506. in the relevant part, states 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or 
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney, 
opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented 
client of his responsibility to retain another attorney or 
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further 
proceedings against the client. A copy of the written notice 
shall be filed with the court and no further proceedings shall 
be held in the matter until 2 0 days have elapsed from the date 
of filing. 
Rule 4-506(3), Code of Judicial Administration (emphasis added). 
Thus, the very terms of the rule itself make it clear that opposing 
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can .-..-- ccurL no!;.: such proceedings. 1" is clearly an abuse ot 
discretion for riv- trial cou.v- ^ucn proceedings in the 
Utah has veiy little case law interpreting :;hi3 rule, 
However •-f*he ;i: ^iictions including Montana and \r~*- York have 
:-._-.. . ... _..•- _,_ —_ .i.^d..i_:.-_ • :i^ .^ai provisions. _^ -61-40? ^f 
the Montana Code Annotated states 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or ceases to 
act as such, a party to an action for whom he was acting as 
attorney must, before any further proceedings are had against 
him, be required by the adverse party, by written notice to 
appoint another attorney or appear in person, 
K 1 > ""7 i 1 I I!": "I I" "; , I I i ) I -I "I > , , i „ -I- TUT,, •%•»-!+
 2 n , "D -> y> \r , -C" "D "~vi -t*-*-J-i lit * 
i f i 'i » I '• :ii t i"",ii : i  ' t I i  L 'i i u::; < a . o c > » 1 i y i U i i L d i l a .Dci l l jv O J L K u l i i i u u p 
v, Bensoi i, the Montana Supreme Court stated, "This section means 
not more than it plainly states, vis, that no proceeding may be had 
agaii ist a pai: !::/;;y ,, i ::i :: • j i ldg mei i t DII : on der c i c tl lei: ste p be taken, until 
he appoints an attorney, unless the prescribed notice is first 
given . " Montana Bank of Roundup v , Benson, 717 P . 2d 6, 7 (I ''!« : > r it. 
lybfcii In another Montana decision wherein the unrepresented party 
was never notified pursuant to §37-61 405, the Court expressly 
stated tha t :i i I tl i e a i bsence of si ich a i IC t::i : '€ ' 'tl i • a • :«:= se :i s stayed b} 
virtue of §37-61 405 , " f icWilliams v.. Clem, 743 P. 2d 577, 586 
(Mont. 198 7 ) . 
T] : s o f N e w Yc: Q: ] :: s:i n: id ] a:t : ] y 1: I : •] • I t l ia .t wl le :i : e i lot:! c e i s ii : >t 
given, pursuant to New York's version of 4-506, such action is 
stayed until both the notice is giver and :. ><•• time required 
t he re a f t e . . s e 1 ap s e d N s - i 1 o :i : ] ::' s s 1 .  11 .- •. • i 
1 6 
If an attorney dies, becomes physically or mentally 
incapacitated, or is removed, suspended or otherwise becomes 
disabled at any time before judgment, no further proceedings 
shall be taken in the action against the party for whom he 
appeared, without leave of the court, until thirty days after 
notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that 
party either personally or in such manner as the court 
directs. 
New York CPLR Rule 321(c) (1993) . New York court's hold that this 
section applies to cases where an attorney has withdrawn from the 
case. In re Von Barren's Estate, 243 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329-330 
(Surrogate Court 1963). Further, in this same case, the court held 
that compliance with this rule is mandatory. JEd. at 330. New York 
court's interpret this section to function as a stay of the 
proceeding until such time as the required notice has been given 
and thirty days thereafter have elapsed. Firemen's Fund Insurance 
Company v. Dietz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1985). 
Finally, in L. Johnson & Sons v. Brighton Commons, 569 N.Y.S.2d 40, 
41 (A.D. 4 Dept 1991), where the lower court dismissed an action on 
a motion to dismiss filed by a party who earlier had failed to 
serve the notice required under CPLR 321(c), the court said, "No 
notice was served upon the plaintiffs and thus the order dismissing 
plaintiffs' causes of action must be nullified and the case 
restored to the court's calendar." 
The Appellees' violated Rule 4-506 by initiating proceedings 
against Hartford Leasing without first serving the notice to appear 
or appoint new counsel required by the rule. Appellees' argument 
that somehow the notice by Hartford Leasing's withdrawing counsel 
somehow relieved them of their burden to file such a notice is 
untenable. No notice of appearance was ever filed by any counsel 
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for Hartford Leasing until after Appellees' motions to dismiss were 
filed. As such, Appellees' violated the Code of J udicial 
Administration. 
The trial court abused its discretion by violating the Utah 
Code of J i idi ::i:ii a ] i \ < Irn :i n i 3 t r a t:i oi :i 1 e a :i : that th € i 3 : 1 lie 
operates as a sta} of airy further proceedings :i n an action until 
compliance is secured. Further, because the requirements under the 
r i il e aie both p 1 i.di 1 ' ;(• "ti K"( >v "rap i iarice 
should be permitted Because the trial court held further 
proceedings in this action i n violation of one of i ts own rules, it 
abused its discretion and this Court must remand this case bacJ c to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the lower court's decision granting 
Appellees' motions to dismiss based not only on the Appellees' 
violations of the Code of J udi cial Adi n :i nistrati :i 01 3 bi it al sc • : 11 the 
repeated and serious abuses of discretion committed by the lower 
- . - -
 T. - -ie lower court abused its discretion, the 
Appellant H a m o i a ^easing requests this Court to reverse the lower 
Court's decision and remand this action for further proceedings. 
RESL-f.^T" 1'iY ','iibm.i t t i-'M M I L . _ <l.iy of February, 1934. 
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